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5GLOBAL JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF
COSMOPOLITAN LIBERALISM
Mainstream liberal international theory comes in two different positions
on the problem of international justice: “social liberalism” and
“cosmopolitan liberalism.”1 Put briefly, social, or internationalist,
liberalism holds that this problem is fundamentally one of fairness to
societies (nations, or peoples),2 whereas cosmopolitan liberalism holds
that it is fundamentally about fairness to persons.3 Social liberalism
seems the most popular position, for, in claiming that the national
community has deep moral significance, it remains close to the
conventional and widely held belief that naturally the claims of
compatriots take priority to those of outsiders. Cosmopolitan liberalism
seems more eccentric, for it entails a critique of all beliefs and theories
that see the state or nation as a zone of special responsibilities
fundamentally distinct and justified separately from general or global
ones.
In this essay, I offer an ethical argument for cosmopolitan liberalism. My
thesis will be that, morally, a liberal international theory should be
“cosmopolitan,” not “social” (or “internationalist”). Only cosmopolitan
liberalism has the potential to articulate international moral values and
principles of fundamental significance for individual, social, cultural, and
political choice. Thus, I shall attempt to show that international justice is
to be interpreted as global justice, that is, a doctrine of egalitarian
distributive justice that applies to the international realm as a single
society of persons.
1 Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (with a new afterword
by the author; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 214-216 and
“Social and Cosmopolitan Liberalism,” International Affairs 75 (1999): 515-529, p.
515.
2 Variations include John Rawls, The Law of Peoples: With “The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited” (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999); R.J. Vincent, Human
Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986);
David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) and Citizenship and
National Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).
3 For variations see Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations; Thomas W.
Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Philippe Van Parijs,
Real Freedom For All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995); Brian Barry, “Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective,”
in Liberty and Justice: Essays in Political Theory 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991);
Charles Jones, Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999).
6My case for cosmopolitan liberalism will rest on a defense of four claims
that concern the moral status of global distributive justice. Taken
together, these claims - to be stated in a moment - define the neo-
Rawlsian cosmopolitanism as advocated by Charles Beitz (presumably
the leading cosmopolitan-liberal theorist) and Thomas Pogge, which is
the most plausible form of cosmopolitan liberalism in my view.4 So
conceived of, cosmopolitan liberalism broadly supports a global version
of John Rawls’s theory of distributive justice.5 The basic idea is that it is
more consonant with the individualist spirit of the Rawlsian project that
parties to the second, international original position be persons, not
societies – indeed, that there be only a single, persons-populated original
position generating a single set of norms for global application. This
procedure will result in a – perhaps to some extent constrained - “global
difference principle,” entailing a commitment to (re)arranging material
resources for the benefit of those with the least, wherever on earth they
may reside.6
The four claims to be defended, then, are the following ones. First, as an
extension of the doctrine of domestic distributive justice, global justice is
natural, since the international realm must be regarded as a global
society, which includes a basic structure that is similar to that of domestic
society. Second, global justice is relevant, since its moral force is not
affected by whatever determines the poverty or wealth of societies. Third,
in being egalitarian, global justice is fair, since, at least beyond a certain
level, global distributive inequality matters. Fourth, global justice is
obligatory, since national communities have no fundamental significance,
which means that no prior, extensive moral obligations to compatriots
exist.
If these claims and so my overall argument are correct, then we should
adopt the cosmopolitan position, and be suspicious of the contrasting
social one, rejecting it as a theoretical endowment of national
communities with deeper significance than is morally justified and as a
false legitimization of global distributive inequalities.
4 For this opinion, see Brian Barry, “Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan
Critique,” in Global Justice, ed. Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer (New York: New
York University Press, 1999), p. 36.
5 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1971) and Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
6 The “difference principle” says that “[s]ocial and economic inequalities are
permissible provided that they are…to the greatest expected benefit of the least
advantaged.” Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 271. It should be noted in advance that,
although the difference principle may plausibly be regarded as a major candidate for a
principle of global justice, the case for cosmopolitan liberalism does not depend on its
full moral validity. More basically, what is required is that it be shown that some
principle of egalitarian distributive justice is morally obligatory at the global level.
7GLOBAL JUSTICE AS NATURAL: THE GLOBAL SOCIETY
AND ITS BASIC STRUCTURE
The first claim I defend is that the international realm must be seen as a
global society including a basic structure that resembles that of domestic
society, and that therefore global justice is natural as an extension of -
what Rawls has meant distributive justice to be - domestic justice. While
not assuming that “the international” is like “the domestic” in having
effective political institutions or a deep sense of community, this – moral
- claim does entail that the first is similar to the latter in those respects
relevant to the justification (not: implementation) of a principle of
distributive justice.7
To understand this claim, we must consider the concepts of “society” and
“basic structure.” A “society,” as Rawls has defined it, is a “cooperative
venture for mutual advantage.”8 The “primary subject” of justice is the
“basic structure” of this society. It is “the way in which the major social
institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the
division of advantages from social cooperation…[Ma]jor institutions
[are] the political constitution and the principal economic and social
arrangements,” that “define men’s rights and duties and influence their
life-prospects.”9 It is the role of these institutions to secure just
background conditions against which the actions of individuals and
associations take place. The existing wealth must have been properly
acquired, and all must have had fair opportunities to earn income, to learn
wanted skills, and so on.10 The basic structure, Rawls says, ought to be
regulated by principles just from the perspective of “free and equal moral
persons.”11 Thus, in working out a conception of distributive justice, we
must abstract from existing inequalities to define a baseline from which
we measure the prospects for fair cooperation. The baseline is one of
equality: principles of justice are acceptable when it would be reasonable
for “equal moral persons,” represented in the “original position,” to
accept them without reference to their actual social positions and
economic endowments.12 To proceed otherwise would bias the theory
7 As regards compliance with a principle of global justice, what is assumed is only the
principal possibility of it. See Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, pp.
154-156, 198-199.
8 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 4.
9 Ibid., p. 7.
10 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 266.
11 Ibid., pp. 259, 262, 271, 272, 280, 281, 282, 287.
12 Ibid., p, 277.
8arbitrarily in favor of the status quo.13 Now, the cosmopolitan-liberal
stance is that a society and basic structure exist that are global rather than
– what Rawls thinks - domestic,14 so that it is natural to globalize the
doctrine of distributive justice.15
What arguments does cosmopolitan liberalism offer in support of the
global society and basic structure claim? To begin with, its argument is
that one can consistently speak of a global society in an ideal sense. If the
original position is to represent individuals as equal moral persons who
should reach agreement on principles of background justice, then the
criterion of membership is possession of the two powers of moral
personality: the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a
conception of the good.16 Now it has been objected that one cannot
plausibly see the world as a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage,”
thus not really as a society in Rawls’s sense.17 It is indeed true that the
extent of global economic cooperation is empirically disputable,18 and
that there is simply too much global inequality and too little mutual
advantage resulting from exchange between the rich and poor.19
However, as Beitz has noted, such criticisms miss the point. Again, what
matters for an ideal conception of a society in Rawls’s sense is that
human beings possess the essential moral powers, regardless of whether
they now belong to a common cooperative scheme. Reasonable
cooperation may not exist today, but at least it could exist.20 Also, it
would be misleading to take the Rawlsian model of a society unduly
literally and thus unnecessarily narrow, both domestically and globally.
13 Ibid., p, 272.
14 Rawls conceives of the basic structure of society as “a closed system isolated from
other societies.” Theory of Justice, p. 8; compare Political Liberalism, pp. 12, 272.
15 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, p. 203; compare “Social and
Cosmopolitan Liberalism,” p. 523; Pogge, Realizing Rawls, p. 240.
16 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 280; Charles R. Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Ideals and
National Sentiment,” Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 591-600, p. 595.
17 Barry, “Humanity and Justice,” p. 194; Brian R. Opeskin, “The Moral Foundations
of Foreign Aid,” World Development 24 (1996): 21-44, p. 30; Christien van den
Anker, “The Role of Globalization in Arguments for Cosmopolitanism,” Acta Politica
35 (2000): 5-36, pp. 22-25.
18 For an impression of the neo-realist response to the neo-liberal globalization thesis
– “predominantly a Western experience” - see Scott Burchill, “Realism and Neo-
Realism,” in Theories of International Relations, ed. Scott Burchill et al. (second
edition; Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 95-97. For extensive criticisms, see
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-
Wesley, 1979) and “Globalization and American Power,” National Interest 59 (2000):
46-56; Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International
Economic Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
19 Barry, “Humanity and Justice,” pp. 194-195.
20 Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment,” p. 595.
9Naturally, without social cooperation there would be no occasion for
justice, since there would be no joint product about which conflicting
claims might be pressed, nor would there be any common institutions to
which principles could apply. But all of the parties to a particular scheme
may not actually cooperate in social activity, and each party may not
actually be advantaged in comparison with what her position would be in
the absence of that scheme. Requirements of justice apply to institutions
and practices - whether or not genuinely cooperative - in which social
activity produces relative or absolute benefits or burdens that would not
exist if the social activity did not take place.21 Skepticism about whether
cooperation is advantageous for those who are favored by existing
inequalities could arise as plausibly in domestic as in global society.
Thus, while the underlying conception of justice as resting on
considerations of mutual advantage is incorrect,22 it is consistent with the
ideal of a global society in which reasonable cooperation exists.
Yet the above argument for a global society is incomplete. Considerations
of distributive justice can only arise globally if the “global society” has a
real base. In other words, it must have a basic structure. Thus,
cosmopolitan liberalism continues the argument by demonstrating that
there is such a global basic structure. The world, the argument goes,
contains institutions and practices at various levels of political
organization – national, regional, and global – that apply to people largely
without their consent and that have the capacity to influence
fundamentally the courses of their lives. These institutions and quasi-
formal arrangements affecting persons’ life prospects throughout the
world are increasingly international ones - international financial
institutions, transnational corporations, the G8, the World Trade
Organization. Together with national and intra-national institutions, these
major international institutions affect persons and their access to desired
goods and resources.23 Importantly, these institutions have profound and
enduring effects on the prospects of individuals, groups, and societies, for
its effects are globally distributive.24 Members of economically
vulnerable societies – particularly the worse-off among them, who lack
private means to fall back on – are exposed, without any effective
recourse, to the consequences of decisions strongly affecting their life
prospects which originate elsewhere. These range from the machinations
of private foreign currency speculators to the macroeconomic
restructuring conditions imposed on emergency lending by multilateral
21 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, pp. 131-132 and 150, n. 52.
22 Ibid., p. 203.
23 Jones, Global Justice, pp. 7-8.
24 See for an extensive treatment Allen Buchanan, “Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for
a Vanished Westphalian World,” Ethics 110 (2000): 697-721, pp. 705-711.
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financial organizations, whose decisions are dominated by the
governments of wealthy societies.25 Also importantly, the world economy
is not something most people can realistically avoid; that only becomes
increasingly difficult.26 Therefore, for cosmopolitan liberals it is obvious
that a global basic structure exists, and that we should not follow Rawls
in restricting distributive justice to the basic structure of the nation-state.
Now, trade, finance, law, and politics do have expanded and tightened
their grip on the lives of persons and groups worldwide, more and more
defining, against their consent, their life-prospects by including or,
indeed, excluding them from social cooperation and its potential
benefits.27 Hence it seems hard to deny the plausibility of the global basic
structure argument. Yet I feel it worthwhile to add that this reality
argument for a global society is no exaggeration in depending too much
on empirical assumptions; there is also a directly ethical case for it. We
presumably cannot prove beyond doubt that the life-chances of all human
beings on earth are affected by border-crossing economic conditions. But
here surely the “precautionary principle” applies. Thus, even if the
empirical case for the global basic structure remains somewhat uncertain,
we should still assume it to be there – Rawls’s own domestic basic
structure assumption being considerably worse - and thus to assume that
the global economy forms a subject matter for justice. Not doing so
would entail taking the risk that the life-chances of those worst-off – now
and in the future – are constantly put into jeopardy. Thus, the case for a
global basic structure is also supported by moral considerations.
Since, then, a global society and basic structure must be said to exist, the
conclusion is that global justice is natural, that is, the natural extension of
the doctrine of distributive justice. As on liberal, normatively
individualist assumptions there are plausible grounds to think global
rather than domestic, the challenge now goes into the direction of Rawls
himself. We shall see, however, that social liberalism has several ways of
taking up this challenge, and that the strength of the global society and
basic structure argument, essential as it is, is not sufficient for
cosmopolitan liberalism to be successful.
25 Charles R. Beitz, “Does Global Inequality Matter?” Metaphilosophy 32 (2001): 95-
112, p. 107. For a highly critical treatment, see Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its
Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2002).
26 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, p. 241; Beitz, Political Theory and International
Relations, pp. 203-204.
27 Compare Ngaire Woods, “Order, Globalization, and Inequality in World Politics,”
in Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics, ed. Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire
Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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GLOBAL JUSTICE AS RELEVANT: THE IRRELEVANCE OF
DETERMINANTS OF WEALTH AND POVERTY
The plausibility of the global society and basic structure claim suggests
that from now on the burden of proof lies with the defenders of a non-
global, restricted liberalism. A first counter-argument of social liberalism
is that the global basic structure argument, whatever its plausibility, is
hardly relevant, since successful economic development of societies is
determined by internal, domestic factors rather than by external,
international ones. To quote Rawls: “the causes of the wealth of a people
and the forms it takes lie in their political culture and in the religious,
philosophical, and moral traditions that support the basic structure of their
political and social institutions, as well as in the industriousness and
cooperative talents of its members, all supported by their political
virtues.”28 Thus, natural resources are not regarded as really important for
domestic economic performance, and especially bad governance and
élite-corruption are felt to be the chief causes of economic misery. Now,
if this counter-argument were valid, then one might think the global basic
structure claim to be insignificant. For, apparently, the wealth and
poverty of societies is determined mainly by internal-ideational factors. In
this way, Rawls would have established that talk of global distributive
justice makes no sense after all. Because of the intuitively suggestiveness
of this counter-argument, a defense seems necessary of the claim that
global justice is really relevant, not offset by economic development as
being determined by internal factors.
Recently, several arguments have been advanced in favor of the
cosmopolitan liberal claim. Thus, first, the question of the importance of
natural resource endowments for domestic wealth is unsettled, and the
“good government argument” is a sweeping generalization. The relative
importance of such factors is a subject of dispute at the general level, and
it certainly varies from one society to another; thus, there are at least
exceptions in individual cases. Second, a society’s integration into the
world economy, reflected in its trade relations, dependence on foreign
capital markets, and vulnerability to the policies of international financial
institutions, can have deep and lasting consequences for the domestic
economic and political structure. Rawls underplays the extent of the
vulnerability of developing societies to global markets and climate
change; he neglects the degree to which the emergence of the unfavorable
conditions that afflict poor societies has as much to do with external and
global factors as with internal ones; and he ignores the extent to which
domestic economic policy is shaped by international economic
28 Rawls, Law of Peoples, p. 108.
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institutions and powerful states.29 Under these circumstances, it may not
even be possible to distinguish between domestic and international
influences on a society’s economic condition.30 At least in individual
cases, the capacity of a people to achieve good government may itself be
influenced significantly by how they are affected by the global basic
structure. Third, even if Rawls were found empirically correct on these
two points, then cosmopolitan liberalism would maintain that we have no
reason to conclude that a principle of global justice is not of interest. Not
the relevance of global distributive justice is at stake, but the relevance of
Rawls’s own conjectures. For that goes instead to the means of
implementing global distributive justice, not to the principle itself. The
means to act according to global justice is a separate, even if difficult,
question of, among other things, foreign policy.31
How strong are these three arguments as responses to Rawls? Note that
the first two are good but not good enough. They are good as an argument
against Rawls’s own position, for they show that a liberal theory of
justice is dubious insofar as it limits the scope of justice because of
empirically disputable assumptions. Social liberalism as defended by
John Rawls and also David Miller tends to reason away real problems of
global scarcity and justice by overplaying the general importance of
ideational factors.32 On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that for
29 Andrew Hurrell, “Global Inequality and International Institutions,” Metaphilosophy
32 (2001): 34-57, p. 48; Simon Caney, “Survey Article: Cosmopolitanism and the
Law of Peoples,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (2002): 95-123, pp. 118-119.
30 Charles R. Beitz, “Rawls’s Law of Peoples,” Ethics 110 (2000): 669-696, p. 690
and Political Theory and International Relations, pp. 206-207.
31 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, pp. 207-208 and “Rawls’s Law
of Peoples,” pp. 690-691.
32 Like Rawls, Miller stresses ideational factors, tending to think of natural resources
as ideational (constructed) rather than material; see Principles of Social Justice
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 234 and On Nationality, p.
106. However, the independent impact of bad natural conditions for the development
of particularly Sub-Saharan Africa is explicitly acknowledged by the one economic
historian on which Rawls relies, namely David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of
Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some Are So Poor (New York: W.W. Norton &
Co., 1998), ch. 1. Generally at least, we should adopt a “rump materialism” here.
Geography and natural resources have some independent impact, for they define in
divergent ways for all actors the outer limits of feasible activity and the relative costs
of pursuing various options that require physical activity. The increasing negative
externalities of technological evolution are an indication that we may be nearing
significant more or less absolute constraints now. Thus, importantly for the relevance
of the global basic structure, human actions may have unintended consequences for
the natural environment that feed back on society, with potentially devastating effect
(global warming, ozone and resource depletion). And even if in the fullness of time all
material constraints are negotiable, in the meantime they are not. Whether we like it
or not, the distribution and composition of material capabilities at any given moment
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the same reason these two responses cannot be good enough as arguments
for cosmopolitan liberalism itself: perhaps one day the empirically
disputable assumptions turn out to have been significantly true.33
However, the more fundamental, third response – poverty having
primarily local sources would not affect the cosmopolitan view of
distributive justice - does seem good enough, because of the following
three points. First, local change being a necessary condition for a
sustainable improvement in well-being does not imply that international
contributions are not also necessary or would not accelerate the process if
suitably deployed.34 Second, the extent to which various global financial
regimes, governance structures, economic agreements, and private
property rights affect the distribution of benefits and burdens, and cause
deep poverty is not the point. What matters – and this is not open to
dispute – is that these conditions do have globally distributive effects
among peoples and persons.35 They should not be taken as given; there
may be reason to change and improve them for the sake of justice.36
Third, Rawls’s counter-argument ignores that from the perspective of the
person - the fundamental moral unit - the (causes of) poverty and wealth
of societies are at best of secondary importance. Poor societies being poor
because they are, say, badly governed might be an argument against the
relevance of distributive justice between societies, but it is in no way an
argument against the relevance of global distributive justice between
persons living in those societies. Even if little could be done to assist
concrete persons subject to unequal treatment, then ethically it would
remain very relevant to call their situation one of global injustice. Seen as
such, the third response offers a successful refutation of the relevance of
Rawls’s counter-argument.
The conclusion is that global justice is relevant indeed. The – contested -
belief that wealth and poverty is a matter of domestic factors is no
fundamental but derivative issue, relevant at best at the level of means.
help define the possibilities of our action. See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of
International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 111-113.
33 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, p. 207 and “Rawls’s Law of
Peoples,” p. 690. Note, though, that it is highly unlikely that the question of the
relative importance of external or internal factors – really a “non-question” – can ever
be answered, and certainly not in any quantitative sense. H.W. Singer, “Lessons of
Post-War Development Experience, 1945-88,” and “The 1990s: On to Fortune or
Bound in Miseries?” In International Development Co-operation: Selected Essays by
H.W. Singer on Aid and the United Nations System, ed., with contrib., D. John Shaw
(Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), p. 77 and p. 86 respectively.
34 Beitz, “Does Global Inequality Matter?” p. 102.
35 Buchanan, “Rawls’s Law of Peoples,” p. 710.
36 Singer, “Lessons of Post-War Development Experience,” pp. 71, 77.
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GLOBAL JUSTICE AS FAIR: GLOBAL INEQUALITY
MATTERS
One might accept the argument so far, but think that what makes
cosmopolitan liberalism still implausible is its commitment to global
egalitarianism: whereas egalitarian justice is appropriate in the domestic
domain, it leads to morally unacceptable consequences if applied to the
international one. Thus, Rawls’s worry seems to be that his cosmopolitan
followers morally distort his theory of distributive justice by extending it
so widely. Now his objection is that a principle of global distributive
justice is unfair: it would in effect reward poor investment decisions by
recipients of redistribution, and penalize societies that invest more
wisely.37 According to him, a development assistance principle would be
the most one could reasonably ask.38 Alternatively, as Miller thinks, what
international justice requires is guaranteeing basic rights and remedying
past exploitation everywhere, but not eliminating inequality, whether
great or small.39 For both, however, the essence of the objection is that,
globally, inequality per se does not matter. Again, we are dealing with a
counter-argument that has intuitive force. Hence I must now defend the
claim that egalitarian global justice is fair, arguing that at some point
global distributive inequality starts to matter for its own sake.
Beitz has tried to defend global egalitarianism in the following way. To
begin with, the implicit analogy between redistribution between societies
and between individuals is faulty, because many in the poorer society will
not have had any influence whatsoever on the choices that led to poor
investments. They are innocent victims of past choices of élites or their
forebears, rather than the authors of those choices themselves; they are
the children of the indolent alcoholic or the spendthrift who does not
save. This being so, thus that the offspring can hardly be seen as
responsible for their own condition, it would be unfair that they would
have to pay the price for decisions they might indeed have rejected. Thus,
it is not clear that requiring better-off societies to redistribute wealth is
unfair. Maybe it is inefficient, but then, instrumental rather than
37 Rawls, Law of Peoples, pp. 116-118; see also David Miller, “Justice and Global
Equality,” in Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics, ed. Andrew Hurrell and
Ngaire Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 193-197.
38 Rawls advocates a duty of assistance to “burdened societies,” which “lack the
political and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, often, the
material and technological resources needed to be well-ordered.” Law of Peoples, p.
106.
39 Miller, “Justice and Global Equality.”
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fundamental considerations – the best practical way of doing something -
are at stake here.40
I believe that Beitz’s argument provides the beginning of a successful
defense.41 Four further points must be made here. First, letting the
potential impact of external determinants aside, I would note that the
analogy involved being faulty is also because many individuals in a rich
society will not have had any influence whatsoever on the choices that led
to adequate investments. They have luckily been born in a society created
by the wise choices of their forebears, rather than the authors of those
choices themselves; at least to some extent, they are the children of the
active worker or the steward who does save. Hence the offspring of the
rich and wise cannot wholly be seen as “responsible” for their own
condition, too, and also for this reason it is not clear that requiring better-
off societies to redistribute wealth is unfair.
Second, insofar as individuals in poor countries still are the authors of
their own choices, it would still not follow that they might be held
responsible for those choices. Within the domestic realm, liberals such as
Rawls insist that society can legitimately do so only if their preferences
and capacities have been formed under conditions of justice. But since it
is wrong to hold individuals responsible for their choices when society
has not provided them with, say, a decent education,42 it would seem that
it is even worse within global society, as individuals in poor countries
have fewer educational and other opportunities that those in rich
countries. Thus, globally as well as domestically, to invoke people’s
allegedly “irresponsible” behavior as a reason not to remedy their unequal
circumstances is to legitimize unfairness: the latter is a condition for
being able to judge the former.
Third, cosmopolitan liberalism does not automatically entail a strict
commitment to global wealth redistribution, not between societies
(distributive equality at this level not being the basic issue anyway) or
even persons; again, the best way to eliminate unjustified global
inequality is a practical, albeit difficult, matter. Thus, in order to establish
fairness between persons, it might (also) be required to create
international trade and financial regimes radically different from present
ones. Or it might perhaps even more urgent to create a fair international
natural resource or climate regime. Indeed, to a certain extent the “wise”
investment decisions themselves could be a cause of unfairness, that is,
40 Beitz, “Rawls’s Law of Peoples,” pp. 691-692 and “Social and Cosmopolitan
Liberalism,” pp. 526-528.
41 Buchanan, “Rawls’s Law of Peoples,” pp. 715-716, n. 17 and Caney,
“Cosmopolitanism and the Law of Peoples,” p. 116.
42 Compare Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction
(second edition; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 93-94.
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given the ecologically limits set by the precautionary principle.43 Seen as
such, it cannot be excluded that the wealth of rich countries itself is, at
least to a certain extent, a matter of irresponsible choice (thus not to be
copied by poor countries), given the ecological damage (say, the
greenhouse effect) it has caused – damage of which persons in poor
countries suffer the consequences (say, floods). The problem, then, is not
the global egalitarianism of cosmopolitan liberalism, but Rawls’s and
Miller’s critique of it, for that morally justifies unlimited (sectional)
economic growth, whether or not that would entail extremely resource-
consuming ways of life.44 It is implausible to exclude in advance that
there may be something unjust about a world in which a single country,
the United States (not to mention the European Union), uses up forty per
cent of total resources and is responsible for more than one third of total
greenhouse gas emission.45 Thus, given an ecologically limited world, a
moral theory may not exclude from the start the outcome that societies
and persons are required to give up a certain way of life, however
psychologically demanding that may be.46
Fourth, the criticism of unfairness poses a threat to the consistency of
Rawls’s own social-liberal position – an inconsistency avoided when the
cosmopolitan position is adopted. Here at least, liberals should agree with
43 In the present context, this principle means that in cases of uncertainty one should
not act: interventions in the environment are permitted only if their harmlessness has
been proven.
44 It would seriously matter if “[g]ross national product reflects, roughly, the use of
irreplaceable natural resources, the burden on the ecosphere, and advantages derived
from the efforts of past generations and past exploitation of other countries.” Barry,
“Humanity and Justice,” p. 202.
45 Compare Brian Barry, “Spherical Justice and Global Injustice,” in Pluralism,
Justice, and Equality, ed. David Miller and Michael Walzer (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995): 67-80, p. 79.
46 James S. Fishkin has argued that one cannot be obliged to give up an entire way of
life for the sake of moral obligation - “an obligation to be heroic.” See The Limits of
Obligation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982) and “Theories of Justice and
International Relations: The Limits of Liberal Theory,” in Ethics and International
Relations, ed. Anthony Ellis (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986).
Fishkin’s argument has been rightly criticized for taking an unreasonably static
conception of human psychology, ignoring the influence of society and culture on
what is seen as “normal” individual activities and levels of sacrifice. See Robert E.
Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 166-167 and Andrew Belsey,
“World Poverty, Justice and Equality,” in International Justice and the Third World,
ed. Robin Attfield and Barry Wilkins (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 44-46. Yet it is
consistent with cosmopolitan liberalism to think that persons have a right, albeit a
significantly limited one, to resist some of the sacrifices that impersonal,
cosmopolitan morality demands in order to pursue their own commitments. Beitz,
“Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment,” pp. 598-599.
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conservatives that, in resisting a global principle of distributive justice,
“Rawls unravels himself.”47 For in claiming that in the international
domain collective desert (industriousness, laziness, talent) and not
(personal) equality is the foundation of justice, Rawls exposes himself to
the objection why he does not advocate the same within domestic society.
But beyond this point, the liberal and conservative go separate ways. The
good reasons for not advocating justice as desert based in domestic
society, where hard-working and talented people have to share with
others for the sake of justice, seem to hold even stronger within global
society: whereas in the former society these others do have at least some
choice, in the latter they often do not.48 At this point, the strength of
cosmopolitan liberalism is that it does not suffer from probably the most
striking ethical omission in Rawls’s international theory: its lack of
direct, unmediated concern for individual well-being.49
Since, then, liberalism consistently applied to the international domain
must maintain that global distributive inequality is in principle a matter of
justice, the conclusion is that global justice is fair. In fact, inequalities
between the world’s rich and poor are not only staggering in size, but also
seem the very paradigm of the sort of morally arbitrary (“brute luck”)
inequality which Rawls says should be remedied.50
GLOBAL JUSTICE AS OBLIGATORY: THE NON-
FUNDAMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE OF NATIONAL
COMMUNITIES
The validity of the claims of global justice as natural, relevant, and fair
offers reasonable ground for believing that global justice exists as a
principle. Yet, at this point the obligation to act according to such a
principle can only be provisional, which means that we still lack
47 David Gordon, “Rawls Unravels Himself,” The Mises Review,
<www.mises.org/misesreview>, 2000.
48 Both in global and domestic society, applying, say, a difference principle under
realistic conditions is not incompatible with honoring productivity-based claims of
desert. Given realistic background conditions about productivity and motivation, it
would still reward superior social productivity with superior social wealth, provided
only that the less productive partner also receives an additional share. Thus, a global
difference principle may be consistent with different levels of wealth among societies
and persons. See Wilfried Hinsch, “Global Distributive Justice,” Metaphilosophy 32
(2001): 58-77, pp. 71-75; compare Charles R. Beitz, “International Liberalism and
Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent Thought,” World Politics 51 (1999): 269-
296, pp. 291-292.
49 Compare Leif Wenar, “Contractualism and Global Economic Justice,”
Metaphilosophy 32 (2001): 79-94, pp. 89-91.
50 Compare Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, p. 268.
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sufficient reason to adopt cosmopolitan liberalism. Since global
distributive justice deeply conflicts with conventional moral convictions
about the significance of the national community and the relationship
with compatriots, a definite obligation to act according to it only exists if
the conventional stance, particularly a moderated version of it, has been
proven wrong. This means that we must deal with the sophisticated,
social-liberal-defense of the claim that national communities have non-
derivative, fundamental significance, and so that a natural basis for
priority for compatriots exists. If social liberalism were correct here, then
it would follow that the global society should be conceived of as a house
divided into various national communities constitutive of personal
identity and so morally more significant than a global justice principle,
which might only have little weight in practical moral reasoning. Hence
the claim I must now defend is that national communities have no
fundamental significance, so that global justice is obligatory indeed.
Again, given the validity of the basic society and structure claim, it seems
quite natural to say that the scope of liberal theory, and thus of its basic
assumption - equal consideration for everyone’s interests, including (to
give the assumption substance) the roughly equal sharing of resources51 –
is global. Being liberal, so it seems, is to advance systematic impartial
treatment, comprehensive coverage, and nonsectarian openness
worldwide;52 to acknowledge that “every human being has a global
stature as an ultimate unit of moral concern;”53 and to advocate applying
“to the whole world the maxim that answers to questions about what we
should do, or what institutions we should establish, should be based on an
impartial consideration of the claims of each person who would be
affected by our choices.”54
Yet, as far as social liberalism is concerned, this seemingly authentic
picture is mistaken. It believes that there is a moral justification for
unequal treatment related to the basic significance of the national
51 Kai Nielsen, “Cosmopolitan Nationalism,” The Monist 82 (1999): 446-468.
52 Compare Amartya Sen, “Global Justice: Beyond International Equity,” in Global
Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, ed. Inge Kaul, Isabelle
Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 119;
Buchanan, “Rawls’s Law of Peoples, ” pp. 697-698; Beitz, “Social and Cosmopolitan
Liberalism,” p. 529; Onora O’Neill, “Justice, Gender and International Boundaries,”
in International Justice and the Third World, ed. Robin Attfield and Barry Wilkins
(London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 55-57.
53 Thomas W. Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” in Political Restructuring
in Europe: Ethical Perspectives, ed. Chris Brown (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 90.
54 Charles R. Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the States System,” in Political
Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives, ed. Chris Brown (London: Routledge,
1994), pp. 124-125; compare Political Theory and International Relations, pp. 199-
200.
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community. Nationality should have fundamental weight in practical
reasoning, and so persons should acknowledge special moral obligations
that override the requirements of egalitarian global morality. To avoid
misunderstanding, the objection is not that we should take no account of
the interests of foreigners at all; it is not about “national egoism” or
raison d’état. Rather, it entails that we should take account of the
interests of non-compatriots in a different, less important way from that in
which we should take account of the interests of compatriots.55 Even so,
accepting the objection implies that at the end of the day global justice
cannot be seen as obligatory.
Before turning to the social-liberal counter-argument in more detail, it is
important to be precise about the cosmopolitan-liberal stance. Again to
avoid misunderstanding, it is not that cosmopolitan liberalism differs
from social liberalism about whether people’s identities and memberships
matter. The real issue is not so much whether identity and membership
matter, but how.56 Thus, cosmopolitan liberalism consistently regards
communities as valuable only insofar as they engender sufficient freedom
from impersonal moral constraints to seek the fulfillment of “projects and
commitments that express our separate identities as autonomous
persons.”57 Given this criterion, as Beitz points out, the best case for the
priority thesis may arise from the value associated with honoring one’s
significant relationships, for this value seems particularly deep and may
generate conflicts with impersonal requirements that are especially
difficult to reconcile. But so construed, the priority thesis will be made
substantially weaker compared with the conventional version. For the
deepest source in personal morality of the permission to give priority to
the self and its projects, that is, the obligations arising from special
relationships, is only contingently related to priority to compatriots.
Everything depends on whether it is reasonable to see one’s relationship
to one’s compatriots as the kind of relationship that can generate
pervasive conflict with impersonal moral requirements. But ethically, as
Beitz contends, citizenship in the modern state is not obviously analogous
to the kinds of personal relationships (such as those to a parent, a spouse,
or one’s children, or even to the members of a face-to-face community)
that produce the most wrenching conflicts with impersonal morality.58
55 Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment,” p. 593.
56 Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the States System,” p. 129.
57 Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment,” p. 598. For a good
elaboration, see Brian Baxter, “The Self, Morality and the Nation-State,” in Ethics
and International Relations, ed. Anthony Ellis (Manchester: Manchester University
Press in association with the Fulbright Commission, 1986), pp. 113-126, especially
113-114 and 123-125.
58 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, p. 212.
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The nation, obviously, is an “imagined community,”59 which means that
the vast majority of one’s compatriots are complete strangers to one. It
would, then, be a mystery as to why they would count for one in the way
that one’s nearest and dearest do.60 In any event, if special obligations to
compatriots could constrain a global difference principle for being
grounded in personal morality, then they would still not weaken the basic
obligation of global justice.
Yet David Miller has offered a remarkable justification of the social-
liberal view that the national community, although “imagined,” has basic
significance, determining one’s impersonal moral obligations.61 Miller
supports his case by advancing two key arguments. First, it is legitimate
to see nationality as part of individual identity, for it is not irrational to
think that belonging to a nation is an important part of who one is. This
follows from the five elements that distinguish a national community: the
members recognize one another as compatriots, and believe to share
relevant characteristics; the community has an identity that embodies
historical continuity; its identity is active in character, which means that
nations do things together, take decisions, achieve results; it connects a
group of people to a particular geographic place or homeland; and it is
marked off from other communities by its distinct public culture.62 To
have a nationality, then, is to believe oneself to be a member of a
community so special, and therefore it is justified.
Second, Miller argues that nations are “ethical communities,” which
entails that members acknowledge special obligations to compatriots that
they do not owe to other human beings. Drawing on a distinction between
two positions, “ethical universalism” (cosmopolitanism) and “ethical
particularism,” he holds that only ethical particularism is compatible with
taking nationality to have independent significance. Crucially, ethical
particularism gives a more realistic account of moral experience by
recognizing that communal affiliations and connections in fact enter into
reasoning about how to act powerfully, thus by relying on motives for
human action stronger than those of abstract reason. Since ethical
particularism is the more plausible position, we should acknowledge that
allowing obligations to compatriots to override those to outsiders is
justified. Yet, as we are also related to non-nationals as human beings, an
exception is possible. Thus, if the basic rights of a people are being
violated and the local government cannot protect them, and if we can act
effectively without endangering the important interests of our own
59 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread
of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), p. 15.
60 Baxter, “The Self, Morality and the Nation-State,” p. 124.
61 See especially Miller, On Nationality and Citizenship and National Identity.
62 Miller, On Nationality, pp. 21-27.
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national community, then we may be required to put global
responsibilities first.63
I believe, however, that both Miller’s key arguments fall short as
justifications of the fundamental significance of nationality and unequal
treatment. Concerning the first one: why should individuals care about a
community they normally have not chosen but is thrust upon them by
birth, and that survives partially because its members have false beliefs
(myths: falsehoods, half-truths) about their individual characteristics and
common history? At this point, Miller offers a twofold response. First, it
may be rational to believe a community’s myths even if they are, strictly
speaking, false, if their widespread acceptance serves such important
purposes as reinforcing a sense of community between generations or
conveying moral values central in the life of the culture.64 Second,
although one cannot have chosen one’s nationality, one may, in a process
of critical self-examination, affirm one’s national identity based on one’s
membership experience in a particular historic community as integral to a
good life.65 For Miller, a universal adoption of this procedure would show
that “for a great many people it matters a great deal that they belong to a
particular nation, that the nation should continue to exist, and that it
should enjoy self-determination.”66
But there are many problems with this double response. First, both points
seem troublingly circular, and from a liberal perspective not sufficiently
persuasive for accepting nationality as an important part of identity to
compete with, let alone to override, the value of global justice.67 Second,
even if it can be shown that most people value their membership in a
national community, for a philosophical defense of the basic significance
of nationality that would be inconclusive. Third, the problem of historical
arbitrariness is much more serious than Miller acknowledges. As Charles
Jones puts it: “In so far as nations…are historical fictions or historically
more…ambiguous than generally believed, they cannot legitimately
generate significant obligations on the part of co-nationals for one
63 Ibid., pp. 49-80.
64 Miller, On Nationality, pp. 35-42. Michael Walzer tends to a similar view, writing
that “imagined, invented…[c]onstructed communities are the only communities there
are, and so they can’t be less real or authentic than some other kind.” See Thick and
Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press), p. 68.
65 Miller, On Nationality, pp. 42-46 and Citizenship and National Identity, p. 165.
66 Miller, Citizenship and National Identity, p. 166.
67 Charles R. Beitz, “Miller, David, On Nationality: Book Review,” Ethics 108
(1997): 225-229, p. 227.
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another.”68 And, as “[g]etting its history wrong is part of being a
nation,”69 this problem seems to affect most, if not all, nations.
Fourth, the belief that the modern nation is, or can be, a community
constitutive of its members’ identity, may well falsely depend on a mere
“romantic” image of the nation.70 Undoubtedly, communitarians such as
Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre would argue that Miller, who
turns to communitarianism to detach liberalism from cosmopolitanism,
overplays the communal character of many contemporary nations. From
their perspective, a priority thesis, which is rational in authentically
communal cases, has become indefensible today.71 Critical of modern
nations as historical fictions, MacIntyre also suggests: “Since all modern
bureaucratic states tend towards reducing national communities to [a]
condition [of reciprocal self-interest], all such states tend towards a
condition in which any genuine morality of patriotism would have no
place and what paraded itself as patriotism would be an unjustifiable
simulacrum.”72 In contrast to Miller, MacIntyre totally rejects the nation-
state as the locus of community, regarding its at times invitation to lay
down one’s life on its behalf as “like being asked to die for the telephone
company.”73 Perhaps MacIntyre’s verdict is too strong. Yet it seems clear
that, from a communitarian perspective, there is not something so
obviously special, something irreplaceable in constituting one’s identity,
about the nation and one’s fellow nationals, that the individual should
acknowledge its moral identity to be constituted by it.
Fifth, consequently, Miller’s implicit, remarkable claim that nations
somehow are entitled to eternal life lacks moral justification. But then,
the very belief in eternal nations makes little sense, if only because
societies in human history, including nations, have always been
contingent and time-bound, that is, functional adaptations to changing
social circumstances.74 Sixth, finally, the communal character of the
68 Jones, Global Justice, p. 161.
69 Ernest Renan, paraphrased by E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780:
Programme, Myth, Reality (Canto edition; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991), p. 12.
70 Compare John O’Neill, “Should Communitarians Be Nationalists?” Journal of
Applied Philosophy 11 (1994): 135-143.
71 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Is Patriotism a Virtue?” The Lindley Lecture (University of
Kansas: Department of Philosophy, 1984); Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits
of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
72 MacIntyre, “Is Patriotism a Virtue?” p. 17.
73 Alasdair MacIntyre, “A Partial Response to My Critics,” in After MacIntyre:
Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre, ed. John Horton and Susan
Mendus (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), pp. 302-303, quotation 303.
74 Being sociologically functional in the modern, industrial world, the nation, too, is
still a contingency, not a universal necessity. See Ernest Gellner, Nations and
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nation is undermined also by the fact that individuals need not, and in the
modern world often do not, live their whole lives in the “narrow” society
into which they are born, only to leave it by death.
As regards Miller’s second key argument, this fails, too. He argues that
ethical universalism (cosmopolitanism) cannot really regard people’s
national relationships as part of the subject matter of ethics, whereas
ethical particularism does afford a faithful picture of practical reasoning
as we actually experience it. Now again, to say that ethical universalism
does not take people’s national relationships into account is misleading;
its main concern is that they never be seen as fundamental. Moreover, as
Beitz and Jones object, this particularist method is suspiciously
conservative. For it seems to deny the capacity of ethical argument to
challenge received belief systematically just at the point that it might be
effective.75 Indeed, cosmopolitan arguments against the ethical principle
of nationality as a defense of the priority thesis might, if sufficiently
strong, lead us to change the way we actually (seem to) think about such
issues.76 It may be added here that Miller’s argument is also dubious for
pinning ordinary people down to particularistic moral beliefs that they
may conventionally hold, but not necessarily so.77
Completing the present argument, I would argue that the failure of
Miller’s key arguments is rooted in his attempt to merge liberalism and
communitarianism into a single perspective, which results in a position
difficult to sustain coherently. Miller has tried to develop a theory of
international justice based on a compromise between the concern for
personal well-being and the conviction that particularistic attachments
may have independent moral significance. But his emphasis on national
Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 6. This being so, it seems
inappropriate to argue for “national identity” as a “primary good” (see for this concept
Rawls, Theory of Justice, pp. 62, 92-93 and Political Liberalism, p. 188), available to
everyone, as Kai Nielsen does in “Cosmopolitan Nationalism.”
75 Beitz, “Miller, David. On Nationality,” p. 228.
76 Jones, Global Justice, pp. 155-156, 167. Therefore, it is false to think that
cosmopolitan liberalism cannot be morally right because its implications under
current circumstances – notably the need to take measures to diminish global
inequality – conflict with widely held convictions. The same would have been true
two centuries ago if it had been suggested that slavery should be abolished worldwide.
Only one century ago, the same would be the case regarding the idea that women
should have the same political and civil rights as men. Perhaps in another century, it
will be a matter for amazement that transfers from rich countries to poor ones of 0,2
or 0,3 per cent of gross national product were once thought appropriate to meet the
moral obligations of people in rich countries. Whether they do or not, to adduce as an
argument against there being such an obligation that many people currently do not
believe that there is seems wrong. See Barry, “Statism and Nationalism,” p. 60.
77 The widespread support for non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty
International, Oxfam, and Greenpeace is one sign.
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self-determination as the key theoretical element and his belief in serious
global obligations do not travel well together. Thus, Miller stresses that
“national self-determination” for a people includes the right “to live
according to their own particular values.”78 But on the other hand, Miller
now advances a weakly egalitarian understanding of global justice, which
he develops from asking “the basic ethical question: what does each of
us, individually, owe to other human beings, regardless of their cultural
make-up, or their citizenship, or their place of residence?”79 This
conception of justice is felt to entail three requirements. We should
respect basic rights everywhere; refrain from exploiting communities and
individuals vulnerable to our actions; and provide all political
communities with the opportunity to achieve self-determination and
justice, that is, as seen by these communities themselves. For Miller, the
first two set limits to our own national self-determination, the third must
be balanced against it, depending upon, say, whether we want an
extensive national health service or a national football stadium; the first
has priority to concern for other communities, the second has not.80
Now, the problem is that such cosmopolitanism, even if relatively
minimal, is at odds with the defense of national self-determination in at
least three ways. First, suddenly asking “the basic ethical question” is
inconsistent with Miller’s ethical particularist method, and seems an ad
hoc concession to cosmopolitanism. And when this question now makes
sense, surely it is the first question to be asked, and answered before an
ethical case for national-self-determination might be made. Second, the
values of a national community, according to which a nation, in Miller’s
view, is entitled to live, may be radically opposed to his understanding of
global justice and its demands. Third, on Miller’s account it is possible
that a nation with a relatively egalitarian conception of justice should
promote the self-determination of nations with inegalitarian conceptions
of justice, thereby sustaining inequality within those nations. Thus, while
Miller’s position ends up as a halfway house between nationalism and
cosmopolitanism, it again seems clear that the latter’s value of global
justice takes priority.
Since, then, national communities cannot be said to have fundamental
significance and the priority thesis thereby lacks a natural foundation, the
conclusion must be that global justice, unrivalled by some impersonal
standard standing at the same level of significance, is obligatory. Insofar
as special responsibilities to compatriots might still be defensible, they
will be so only because of their significance for personal morality (which,
78 Miller, Citizenship and National Identity, p. 162.
79 Ibid., p. 174.
80 Ibid., pp. 173-178 and “Justice and Global Equality,” pp. 198-209; compare On
Nationality, pp. 104-106.
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as we have seen, is not clear). Being nowhere near as extensive as the
priority for compatriots present in conventional morality this way, at best
they would constrain but not undermine the obligation of global justice. I
think we should even be suspicious of social liberalism as a theoretical
defense of the national community. A perfect legitimization of the
Western welfare state, this meant-to-be theory of the nation serves the
interests of those relatively affluent, “liberal” societies that have most to
gain from the widespread internalization of a doctrine that rejects the
requirements of global justice.81 Again, we have touched upon an
implausible moral justification of a resource-consuming way of life, now
fueled by a neo-Herderian obsession with “identity,” while it results from
individual, social, cultural, and political choice from which liberal theory
should keep its critical distance.
CONCLUSION
If my argument in this essay has been correct, then global justice is
natural, relevant, fair, and obligatory, and so the international realm
should be seen as a single society of persons to be governed by an
egalitarian doctrine of distributive justice. Consequently, cosmopolitan
liberalism, not social liberalism, is the ethically adequate international
liberal position. I end by making two comments on the significance of
this result.
First, cosmopolitan liberalism being ethically adequate means that it is
adequate as an international moral theory, entailing a critical perspective
on individual, social, cultural, and political choice that is in no way
affected by its potentially utopian character. Pogge puts the point well:
“Perhaps it is naïve or utopian to hope that any future world will better
accord with a Rawlsian conception of global justice. But this is an
indictment not of that conception but of ourselves…We cannot
reasonably demand of moral principles that they vindicate the status
81 Compare Debra Satz, “Equality of What among Whom? Thoughts on
Cosmopolitanism, Statism, and Nationalism,” in Global Justice, ed. Ian Shapiro and
Lea Brilmayer (New York: New York University Press, 1999), p. 68. It has been
correctly noted that Miller’s argument is problematic in granting autonomy to states
based on an argument about the ethical significance of nationality. Thus, his ethical
defense of nationality falsely turns on treating all states as if they had the attributes
that he ascribes to nations. See Margaret Moore, “Miller’s Ode to National
Homogeneity,” Nations and Nationalism 2 (1996): 423-429, p. 425 and Brian Barry,
“Nationalism versus Liberalism?” Nations and Nationalism 2 (1996): 430-435, p.
431.
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quo.”82 Indeed, it is false to suggest that principles of justice have no
useful role to play prior to the point at which they can be successfully
implemented. They need not be implemented ever or fully in order to
serve their distinctive normative function: their tendency to undermine
the legitimacy of the status quo.83 Under present circumstances, it would
rightly hold particular fundamental value orientations within global
society to be wrong, including the belief, legitimized by social liberalism,
that unequal treatment of persons can be morally justified. That is why it
is anything but useless setting out morally binding principles for
reforming the global basic structure, even if in fact we have no means to
implement these reforms.84
But second, my argument in this essay, even if correct indeed, does not
mean that cosmopolitan liberalism may now be regarded as an adequate
normative international political theory, which is how Beitz has presented
his neo-Rawlsian cosmopolitanism.85 Perhaps the recent conception of
political philosophy as a branch of ethics (i.e., moral philosophy)86 cannot
be extended from the domestic domain of hierarchy to the international
domain of anarchy. And if so, an international political theory might have
to incorporate more normative elements than the liberal value of global
justice alone. One must therefore also consider the relationship between
morality and politics in international life, which might lead one to
include, alongside global justice, particular values that are non-moral yet
fundamental to international politics.87 In any event, the political-
philosophical adequacy of cosmopolitan liberalism is a distinct question
demanding separate treatment.
82 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, p. 260; compare Andrew Kuper, “Rawlsian Global Justice:
Beyond the Law of Peoples to a Cosmopolitan Law of Persons,” Political Theory 28
(2000): 640-674, p. 655.
83 Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer, “Introduction,” in Global Justice, ed. Ian Shapiro
and Lea Brilmayer (New York: New York University Press, 1999), p. 9; Buchanan,
“Rawls’s Law of Peoples,” pp. 713-714.
84 Here again, I disagree with Miller, Principles of Social Justice, p. 6.
85 Beitz makes no distinction between normative “political theory” and “moral
judgement,” but seems to believe that the latter expresses the real meaning of the
former. See Terry Nardin’s review of the first, 1979 edition of Political Theory and
International Relations in The American Political Science Review 74 (1980): 795-
796, p. 795.
86 See Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, especially pp. 3-5. For a
critique, see Frank R. Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy beyond Fact
and Value (Stanford, Cali.: Stanford University Press, 1996).
87 Compare David Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations: From
Thucydides to the Present (Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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GLOBAL JUSTICE AND ITS LIMITS:
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THEORY FROM
COSMOPOLITAN LIBERALISM TO COSMOPOLITAN
PLURALISM
When John Rawls’s magnum opus A Theory of Justice was published in
1971, it did not take long for liberal political theory to go international.
Having started with a critique of the standard, skeptical political realist
doctrine of the impossibility of meaningful international choice,
international liberalism most radically expresses itself in a position called
“cosmopolitan liberalism.”88 In its most plausible version, the neo-
Rawlsianism of Charles Beitz (presumably the leading cosmopolitan-
liberal theorist) and Thomas Pogge,89 cosmopolitan liberalism broadly
supports a global version of Rawls’s theory of distributive justice.90 The
basic idea is that it is more consonant with the individualist spirit of the
Rawlsian project that parties to the second, international original position
be persons, not societies – indeed, that there be only a single, persons-
populated original position generating a single set of norms for global
application. This procedure will result in a – maybe somewhat
constrained - “global difference principle,” entailing a commitment to
(re)arranging material resources for the benefit of those with the least,
wherever on earth they may reside.91
This essay examines the question of how an adequate international
political theory looks like. This means, specifically, that I shall examine
to what extent cosmopolitan liberalism qualifies. In doing so, I assume its
88 Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (with a new afterword
by the author; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 214-216 and
“Social and Cosmopolitan Liberalism,” International Affairs 75 (1999): 515-529, p.
515. Variations include Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations; Thomas W.
Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Philippe Van Parijs,
Real Freedom For All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995); Brian Barry, “Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective,” in Liberty and
Justice: Essays in Political Theory 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); Charles Jones,
Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
89 See for this opinion Brian Barry, “Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan
Critique,” in Global Justice, ed. Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer (New York: New
York University Press, 1999), p. 36.
90 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1971) and Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
91 The “difference principle,” as defined by Rawls, holds that “[s]ocial and economic
inequalities are permissible provided that they are…to the greatest expected benefit of
the least advantaged.” Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 271.
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moral superiority from the outset, that is, its rightness about international
justice as global distributive justice. Although I have offered a defense of
this assumption elsewhere,92 my argument will therefore be hypothetical.
However, it is important to consider whether the conception of political
philosophy as a branch of moral philosophy, dominant since A Theory of
Justice,93 can plausibly be transported from the domestic to the
international domain, even if this procedure means accepting arguendo
the moral value of global distributive justice. In advocating the
application of Rawls’s theory to international politics, cosmopolitan
liberalism seems to assume exactly this. Therefore, what we must know is
whether there are non-moral yet normative aspects typical of international
politics that might threaten the adequacy of cosmopolitan liberalism as an
international political theory, and if so, give rise for the need to develop a
better one.
“Political theory,” as I use the term here, refers to a specifically
normative theory that offers critical guidance to political choice and the
justification of it in matters of institutions and practices. The appropriate
criterion of adequacy for such an “ideal” conception of politics is the
criterion of “realistic utopia” offered by John Rawls. As Rawls writes,
“political philosophy is realistically utopian when it extends what are
ordinarily thought to be the limits of practicable political possibility and,
in so doing, reconciles us to our political and social condition.” As a
result, a political theory must be ideal in a sense inspired by Rousseau,
taking “men as they are and laws as they might be.” This means that a
political theory is adequate if it both has a vision of what is ideally just
and keeps an eye on what is workable and applicable to ongoing political
and social arrangements, feasible, and could possibly exist.94 Thus, I
would say that an adequate international political theory includes an ideal
conception not merely of the national or global society (the “utopia”), but
92 My ethical defense of cosmopolitan liberalism entails that its conception of
international justice as basically one of fairness between persons is adequate, because:
(i) the international realm must be regarded as a global society, which includes a basic
structure resembling that of domestic society; (ii) the moral relevance of global justice
is not affected by whatever determines the poverty or wealth of societies; (iii) at least
beyond a certain level, global distributive inequality matters; and (iv) national
communities have no fundamental significance, which means that no extensive moral
obligations to compatriots exist that offset the demands of global justice. I defend
these claims against non-cosmopolitan but “social” liberal moral criticisms offered by
John Rawls and David Miller. See Menno R. Kamminga, “Global Justice: The
Morality of Cosmopolitan Liberalism,” forthcoming.
93 See Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (second
edition; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), especially pp. 3-5.
94 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples: With “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), quotations pp. 11, 13.
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in particular of international politics, in which the “utopian” stands in
interaction with the “realistic.”
My main thesis in this essay will be twofold. First, (even) if one thinks
that the problem of international justice is about fairness to persons, then
one should still acknowledge that cosmopolitan liberalism is inadequate
as an international political theory, namely for being “idealistically
utopian.” It is inherently revolutionary for being incompatible with the
present states system, assuming a world state and government to be
desirable as well as possible. In abstracting too much from the
international political context of which tragedy seems an ineradicable
feature, cosmopolitan liberalism cannot offer appropriate assistance to the
making of justified political choice. Second, again if one believes in the
morality of global justice, then in international political theory one
should, in view of the fundamental political significance of a
decentralized system of international politics, move beyond liberalism
towards a position of “cosmopolitan pluralism” that does meet the
realistic utopia criterion. Such a theory includes global justice, but also
non-liberal values such as international order or peace, and national
security and well-being. Thus, an ideal conception of international
politics must still incorporate particular aspects of political realism.
COSMOPOLITAN LIBERALISM AS INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL THEORY
There is no doubt that neo-Rawlsian cosmopolitanism is meant as an
international political theory in the specifically normative sense. Beitz in
particular presents his version as a concrete answer to the political
question: “When choices are to be made regarding the ends and means of
political action, or the structure and rules of institutions and practices, it is
natural to ask by what principles such choices should be guided.”95 Thus,
cosmopolitan liberalism is the ideal theory that “prescribes standards that
serve as goals of political change in the nonideal world.”96 Again, this
ideal theory applies “to the whole world the maxim that answers to
questions about what we should do, or what institutions we should
establish, should be based on an impartial consideration of the claims of
each person who would be affected by our choices.”97 The first question
to be answered below is whether cosmopolitan liberalism is indeed
95 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, p. 5.
96 Ibid., p. 156.
97 Charles R. Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the States System,” in Political
Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives, ed. Chris Brown (London: Routledge,
1994), pp. 124-125.
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capable of offering adequate guidance to international political choice.
This question may be said to have two parts, as I now try to show.
A core thesis of cosmopolitan liberalism is that it may well be agnostic
about the proper structure of international institutions, and does not
necessarily have to hold that states should be subordinated to a global
political authority or a world government.98 For cosmopolitan liberalism,
political institutions, be they non-national, national, or global, have at
best instrumental significance as means to the achievement of the goal of
global distributive justice, and thus are subject to consequentialist
reasoning. Now, as soon as it conceives of this thesis as a political-
theoretical one, cosmopolitan liberalism takes on board a crucial
assumption: global justice could be achieved as a result of adequate
political choice, irrespective of the way the international realm happens to
be institutionally organized at present. Thus, while it naturally does not
assume that a globally just world is guaranteed to come about,
cosmopolitan liberalism does assume that the ideal of global justice is not
beyond the scope of politics, to which no “starting-position,” so to speak,
could pose insuperable obstacles.
This crucial assumption has far-reaching implications. Given the
undeniable fact that contemporary international politics is organized as a
decentralized system of states as primary actors,99 the assumption may
mean either of two things. First, the ideal of global justice is compatible
with the states system. Second, alternatively, it could be achieved by
working cooperatively towards either some other effective decentralized
political system or a centralized one. For cosmopolitan liberalism to be
adequate as a political theory, one of these implications must be both
possible and desirable. In the following two sections, I examine these two
parts of which our original question about the political-philosophical
adequacy of cosmopolitan liberalism consists.
COSMOPOLITAN LIBERALISM AS IDEALISTIC UTOPIA I:
THE INCOMPATIBILITY WITH THE STATES SYSTEM
Is the ideal of global distributive justice compatible with the present
states system? Hedley Bull has offered a basic reason to believe that this
is not so. “Demands for world justice are…demands for the
transformation of the system and society of states, and are inherently
revolutionary. World justice may be ultimately reconcilable with world
98 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, p. 199; Barry, “Statism and
Nationalism,” p. 35.
99 This is acknowledged in Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, pp.
153, 215-216.
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order, in the sense that we may have a vision of a world or cosmopolitan
society that provides for both. But to pursue the idea of world justice in
the context of the system and society of states is to enter into conflict with
the devices through which order is at present maintained.”100 Now it
seems true indeed that what the present states system at most can
establish by itself, that is, insofar as states form a “society” because of
common interests and values, is “international order,” which is something
different from “world order,” essential for global justice to flourish. This
results from the fundamental feature of international decentralized
politics: anarchy, that is, the absence of an institution that enforces moral
norms.101
A second reason to doubt the compatibility of global justice and the states
system is also related to the problem of international anarchy: under
anarchy, the first virtue of politics seems to be prudence, rather than
justice. At the heart of cosmopolitan liberalism lies a moral commitment
to an equal consideration for everyone’s interests, given substance by the
inclusion of a roughly equal sharing of resources,102 and this entails a
rejection of the belief in a natural basis for priority for compatriots.
However, international political theory must take account of the problem
that at present “international politics occurs among individuals organized
into states.”103 Equal consideration of the interests of everyone affected is
a sound guideline for moral criticism of the status quo, but not for
political choice within the context of the states system. It cannot be the
responsibility of political leaders, who are bound by their role to at least
some normative political realism,104 to practice global justice. For that
100 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London:
Macmillan, 1977), p. 88. Note that Bull’s definition of “cosmopolitan or world
justice” is, like that of cosmopolitan liberalism, characterized by an egalitarian
conception of it. For him, it entails “a more equitable distribution of wealth among all
individual members of human society” or “minimum standards of wealth and welfare
within this society.” Ibid., p. 85.
101 See Lea Brilmayer, “Realism Revisited: The Moral Priority of Means and Ends in
Anarchy,” in Global Justice, ed. Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer (New York: New
York University Press, 1999).
102 Kai Nielsen, “Cosmopolitan Nationalism,” The Monist 82 (1999): 446-468.
103 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Ethics and Foreign Policy,” An Occasional Paper (Aspen
Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1985), p. 1.
104 Importantly, realism is different from nationalism. Prominent realists such as Hans
Morgenthau, Hedley Bull, and Robert Gilpin, in stressing the key role of the state in
an anarchical international milieu and their sober expectations regarding human
possibilities, are by no means nationalists who believe the national community to
have deep moral significance. Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the
International Economic Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 15-
16. Notably Bull may be seen as a moral cosmopolitan. Compare Anarchical Society,
p. 21.
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could imply, for example, that a political leader would have to give
precedence to others, all of the others abroad who are poorer, before
using any of his resources for domestic self-improvement. Before he or
she can spend a penny on the poor within one’s own state, he has to spend
on all those infinitely poorer elsewhere. “That is not the way politics can
work.”105
Given the anarchical character of the international political system, the
problem here is that the role-bound duties of the statesman or (–woman)
entails that he acts as a trustee for the security and economic interests of
those he represents, and that he preserves international order.106 This
means that he, in helping others, cannot go beyond what can be consented
to domestically. A leader cannot violate domestic public opinion in this
matter. He should educate it, making it less parochial or selfish. But he
cannot go so far ahead as to be rejected.107 But even if domestic public
opinion favors drastic measures to promote global justice, then
responsible statesmen would still act according to a certain kind of
cynicism that lies at the core of the normative vision of political realism:
people cannot generally be expected to act as they should morally. Thus,
statesmen should act prudentially, and this means that the extent to which
they can be expected to act according to the obligation of global justice is
seriously limited.108
Finally, a third reason to doubt the compatibility of global justice and the
present system of states is suggested, remarkably, by Beitz himself. Beitz
believes that for the ethics of statesmanship one particular aspect of
political realism contains an essential truth: “heuristic realism.” Strongly
adverse of “utopianistic”109 or “legalistic-moralistic” approaches,110
heuristic realism advances a cautionary (but not skeptical) view about the
role that moral considerations should be allowed to play in practical
reasoning about international affairs, particularly that of individuals
charged with making decisions about national foreign policy. It warns of
the predictable kinds of errors that can occur when moral principles are
105 Stanley Hoffmann, Duties beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of
Ethical International Politics (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981), p.
155.
106 Nye, “Ethics and Foreign Policy,” pp. 9-12.
107 Hoffmann, Duties beyond Borders, p. 157.
108 Compare Brilmayer, “Realism Revisited.”
109 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 (second edition; London:
Macmillan, 1946), p. 10.
110 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace
(fifth edition, revised; New York, N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 12; George F.
Kennan, American Diplomacy (expanded edition; Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1984), p. 95.
33
applied naively or in the wrong way.111 Now indeed, the contribution of
heuristic realism is constructive, since calculating the consequences of
actions is much more difficult in the international domain of anarchy than
the domestic one of hierarchy. Political actions may have various effects
on the system of states, individual states, and individuals within states,
including effects that lead to greater injustice. And indeed, to strengthen
the point, it is a fundamental feature of international politics that the
freedom to judge and act is limited; that the outcomes of action are
uncontrollable and unpredictable, and may even lead to chaos; and that
the difficulty of assessing the situation renders all action insecure. “Far
more than domestic statecraft, international statecraft is statecraft in the
dark. It is often blind statecraft.”112 This being so, we must accept caution
to be a primary international political virtue, too. But the international
political theorist must then also do what Beitz never seems to do, namely
acknowledge that the establishment of a just global society is hampered
by the duty of the statesman to practice caution.
One could object that the above analysis is unduly pessimistic. I consider
two versions of such an objection. First, one might think that, eventually,
the ideal of global justice could be the result of piecemeal changes,
gradual advances, or incremental improvements. Thus, Beitz’s reply to
critics claiming that cosmopolitan theories are politically unrealistic is
that such a theory “might…establish incremental or reformist goals
capable of being accomplished under prevailing conditions and seek ways
to change these conditions so that further incremental improvements can
eventually be brought about.”113 However, if meant to demonstrate the
compatibility of global justice and the states system, then this reply fails.
Tragically, the highly inegalitarian global distribution of wealth is
protected and reinforced by the political division of the world into
sovereign states that differ greatly from one another in their political
power and over whom no international authority is binding.114 A chain of
incremental improvements, still relying essentially on the dynamics of
“self-help,” does not go at the roots of the moral blemishes that
proliferate in international affairs, and its occasional good results are
reversible only too easily (a lesson, indeed, from heuristic realism).115
111 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, pp. 186-191; for a similar
point see Andrew Kuper, “Rawlsian Global Justice: Beyond the Law of Peoples to a
Cosmopolitan Law of Persons,” Political Theory 28 (2000): 640-674, p. 653.
112 Hoffmann, Duties beyond Borders, p. 21.
113 Charles R. Beitz, “International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of
Recent Thought,” World Politics 51 (1999): 269-296, p. 290.
114 Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer, “Introduction,” in Global Justice, ed. Ian Shapiro
and Lea Brilmayer (New York: New York University Press, 1999), p. 5.
115 Stanley Hoffmann, “The Political Ethics of International Relations,” Seventh
Morgenthau Memorial Lecture on Ethics & Foreign Policy (New York: The Carnegie
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Thus, incrementalism will never bring the goal of global justice within
our reach, as a problem-solving approach leaving the main roots of the
inequality between rich and poor states and persons intact.
A second, more radical version of our objection may be derived from
Stanley Hoffmann’s concept “transformism.” Essentially, he explains,
transformism aims at reforming the present world order so as to introduce
as much interstate and transnational society into the framework of
anarchy as is possible. Such a strategy requires certain kinds of leaders
and – not to forget - certain kinds of citizens, broad-minded and daringly
active. The leaders should not be narrow tribalists, just like they should
not be heroes or ideological crusaders. They need to be compassionate,
open, and capable of making informed decisions. More importantly,
citizens should be able and willing to pressure, to prod, to censor their
government, and also to act independently across borders, notably by
creating transnational civil networks. This approach, then, would push
politics as far as possible in a more cosmopolitan direction.116
Hoffmann’s suggestion, even if vague, is interesting and important, for it
invites not only statesmen but also their citizens to work effectively to
“soften,” so to speak, the logic of anarchy. It might entail a more
successful version of the pessimism objection: global justice is still a
possibility within the context of the states system, for citizens and
statesmen can be said to have an obligation to create the required
additional transnational social bonds and institutions, or strengthen
present ones.
But what ground is there for believing that the logic of anarchy could
ever be softened? A basis may be found in Alexander Wendt’s
constructivist approach to international politics. According to Wendt,
there is no “logic of anarchy” per se. Rather, anarchy is a social
construction, and so “anarchy is what states make of it.”117 Thus, the
“culture” of anarchy is dependent on what states and other actors
(mainly) through those states do. Wendt claims that anarchy can have at
least three distinct cultures: “Hobbesian,” “Lockean,” and “Kantian,”
which are based on different role relationships: “enemy,” “rival,” and
“friend” respectively. For much of international history, states lived in a
Hobbesian culture, where the logic of anarchy was kill or be killed. But in
the seventeenth century European states founded a Lockean culture,
Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1988), p. 19. Note that Beitz himself
warns for “the pitfalls of a false incrementalism.” Political Theory and International
Relations, p. 170.
116 Hoffmann, “The Political Ethics of International Relations,” p. 19.
117 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of
Power Politics,” International Organization 46 (1992): 391-425 and Social Theory of
International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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where conflict was constrained by the mutual recognition of sovereignty.
This culture eventually became global, albeit in part through a Hobbesian
process of colonialism. In the late twentieth century, the international
system underwent another structural change, that is, cultural change, to a
Kantian culture of collective security. So far this change is mostly limited
to the West, and even here it is still tentative, but a case can be made that
it has happened.118 Now, if Wendt is correct on this point, then there
could be significant progress in international politics, so that it may be
possible to work towards the ideal of global justice after all. What is
needed to eliminate the strong need to be prudent and cautious instead of
straightforwardly just seems possible: the construction of a worldwide
“Kantian culture.” In this way, we have construed a Hoffmann-Wendt
objection to the view that global justice and the states system are
incompatible.
Is this more radical objection successful? It must be admitted that it does
modify the original account somewhat, for, apparently, the “depth” of
anarchy can vary, and so also the freedom of movement of political
leaders for promoting global justice. Yet it faces serious limits, and we
should refrain from carrying it too far. First, in accepting a constructivist
analysis such as Wendt’s, cosmopolitan liberalism would make itself
dependent upon a theory of international politics that, like others, is
subject to serious theoretical and empirical dispute.119 Second, being
skeptical of simple progress himself, Wendt actually stresses the
fundamentally conservative rather than progressive nature of these
cultures.120 Third, we must doubt the possibility of a Kantian culture truly
worldwide rather than merely Western. States becoming “friends” on a
worldwide scale seems possible in science fiction cases alone, for only
then could there be deeply shared interests and values. There is no reason
to expect that the states system, even if transformed, can ever overcome
human weaknesses (cognitive as well as moral) and countervailing
incentives to maintain the status quo, and is able to create this culture by
making conscious choices, without producing counter-effective results. In
short, to base one’s claim of the compatibility of global justice and the
states system on the potential emergence of a global Kantian culture has
no other foundation than sheer optimism.
118 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 246-369.
119 See the critical reviews of Social Theory and International Politics and Wendt’s
response to them in Review of International Studies 26, 1 (2000).
120 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 308-312.
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Thus far, we must conclude that the ideal of global distributive justice is
incompatible with the states system.121 Indeed, it would be “idealistically
utopian” to believe otherwise.
COSMOPOLITAN LIBERALISM AS IDEALISTIC UTOPIA II:
THE NEED FOR AN IDEAL WORLD GOVERNMENT
I now examine the alternative claim that global justice may be achieved
by working cooperatively towards either some other effective
decentralized political system or a centralized one, starting with the
decentralized option.
A liberal theorist recognizing that a cosmopolitan political theory may not
be silent about political institutions, Thomas Pogge once offered a plea
for global economic centralization combined with political
decentralization. Thus, from the standpoint of a cosmopolitan morality,
the concentration of power at one level – that of the state – seems
indefensible today.122 For Pogge, what is needed is a global order in
which sovereignty is widely distributed vertically. Persons should be
citizens of, and govern themselves through, a number of political units of
various sizes, without any one political unit being dominant and thus
occupying the traditional role of the state. Their political allegiance and
loyalties should be widely dispersed over these units: neighborhood,
town, county, and province. People should be politically at home in all of
them, without converging upon any one of them as the lodestar of their
political identity. Pogge believes that one great advantage of this multi-
layered scheme is that it can be reached gradually from where we are
now. This requires moderate centralizing and decentralizing moves
involving the strengthening of political units above and below the level of
the state.123
In effect, what Pogge argues for is what Bull calls “neo-
mediaevalism”:124 “a system of overlapping authority and multiple
loyalty.”125 However, such a new mediaevalism might turn out to be
worse than the present states system. While a neo-medievalist
international society could “avoid the classic dangers of the system of
121 See also Kimberly Hutchings, International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in
a Global Era (London: SAGE Publications, 1999), pp. 40-41.
122 Thomas W. Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” in Political Restructuring
in Europe: Ethical Perspectives, ed. Chris Brown (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 99.
123 Ibid., pp. 99-117.
124 Hidemi Suganami, “Comments and Conclusions,” in Political Restructuring in
Europe: Ethical Perspectives, ed. Chris Brown (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 242.
125 Bull, Anarchical Society, p. 254.
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sovereign states” by encouraging “overlapping structures and criss-
crossing loyalties,”126 such a world would be subject to serious dangers.
Mediaevalist society with its complex structure of overlapping
jurisdictions and multiple loyalties has been even more violent than the
modern system of states.127 While any decentralized political system has
to solve the problem of order and peace, the present states system seems
better equipped to carry out this task than so complex a neo-mediaeval
one. For all their drawbacks, the state and the state system play a positive
role in world affairs by maintaining domestic and international order;
without them, there would perhaps not be any order at all.128 Thus,
Pogge’s vision, even if we would accept arguendo the unlikely possibility
that it is not out of reach, might entail an undesirable alternative for the
present states system, offering insufficient basis for trusting that the
alternative device will establish global justice more likely.
Thus far, the conclusion is that global justice is not to be realized within
the context of some decentralized political system or another. Negatively
speaking, as a theory meant to have not merely moral but political impact,
cosmopolitan liberalism cannot plausibly maintain an attitude of
institutional agnosticism, as Beitz wishes to do. Positively speaking, it
cannot avoid opting for global institutional centralization as a “reliable
way of enforcing compliance with international redistributive policies.”129
This stance I now elaborate.
Importantly, the practical-political suggestions cosmopolitan liberals
offer stand a chance of being effective only if implemented by a world
government. Analogously to the domestic case, this is because such
proposals, if consistent with the basic tenets of cosmopolitan liberalism,
should ideally guarantee that the worst-off citizens in the world are made
better of, directly or indirectly, and one cannot simply expect or trust their
local governments to do this. Thus, Beitz writes: “[Concerning the role of
considerations of distributive justice], the international situation seems to
me not very different from the domestic. Within a society, it is naïve and
possibly false to think that the most effective means of improving the
situation of the worst-off is engage in a continuing process of income
transfers from rich to poor; other strategies – such as a system of wealth
taxation combined with aggressive measures to ensure equality of
educational and economic opportunity – may be more successful.”130 But
126 Ibid., p. 255.
127 Ibid., p. 254-255.
128 Hedley Bull, “The State’s Positive Role in World Affairs,” Daedalus 108, 4
(1979): 111-123.
129 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, p. 155.
130 Charles R. Beitz, “Rawls’s Law of Peoples,” Ethics 110 (2000): 669-696, p. 690.
Compare the radical proposals for an international gross national product taxation in
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if so, then why not endorse a world government? For that will be needed
to implement global justice effectively, both because then the
bureaucracy to deliver global welfare state measures would be in place
and because then the measures could be financed through international
taxation.131
Strengthening the point, I would stress that, while in well-governed
domestic societies one can mostly act with the moral confidence that
“right” actions will have “good” results, in global society the lack of a
good and strong global political system increases the likelihood that well-
intentioned actions will backfire. It follows that the confidence required
for full justice - assurances that if one acts morally the consequences will
generally work out for the best - internationally can only be given in the
same way as it is given domestically, namely by a strong and good, well-
ordered political system.132 And, to quote Bull again: “World order, or
order in the great society of all mankind, is…the condition of realisation
of goals of…cosmopolitan justice. If there is not a certain minimum of
security against violence, respect for undertakings and stability of rules of
property…a just distribution of burdens and rewards in relation to the
world common good can have no meaning.”133 Hence a Rawlsian
cosmopolitan political theorist cannot completely disavow support for
global organization, and the natural duty of justice would be to work for
the creation of just global institutions, or for the improvement of existing
ones.134 We must ask, then, if it is possible and desirable to try to
Barry, “Humanity and Justice,” pp. 202-203 and “Statism and Nationalism,” p. 40; for
a global basic income in Van Parijs, Real Freedom For All, pp. 223-228; and for a
global resources dividend in Thomas W. Pogge, “A Global Resources Dividend,” in
Ethics of Consumption: The Good Life, Justice, and Global Stewardship, ed. David
Crocker and Toby Linden (Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).
131 Kai Nielsen, “World Government, Security, and Social Justice,” in Problems of
International Justice, ed. Steven Luper-Foy (London: Westview Press, 1988). Note
that, alternatively, to allow poor people to come to where the resources are, which
would require rich countries to open their borders to people from poor countries,
would need new global institutions, too. This option is insufficient, since it is usually
only the better-off within poor countries who can afford to uproot themselves and
travel to rich countries; compare Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, pp.
269 and 282-283, n. 46. But more importantly, given the compliance problem, it, too,
would have to be enforced by a world state.
132 Brilmayer, “Realism Revisited.” Compare Hoffmann, Duties beyond Borders, p.
196.
133 Bull, Anarchical Society, p. 97.
134 The logical outcome of globalizing the Rawls’s notion of a “natural duty of
justice” is stressed in Ryszard Legutko, “Cosmopolitans and Communitarians: A
Commentary,” in Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives, ed. Chris
Brown (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 226-227. Compare R.J. Vincent, Human Rights
and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 119,
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implement global justice by establishing a world state – a centralized
monopoly of violence strong enough to eliminate the basic problem of
anarchy.
The idea of a world state has found much opposition among Kantian
liberals and others, and, it seems to me, with good reason. Thus, Michael
Walzer plausibly holds that global justice would entail a state of affairs in
which a set of international bureaucrats seize power in order to enforce
global solidarity “from above.” The required drastic redistribution of the
world’s resources and/or creation of truly fair international economic and
ecological regimes “could not be enforced without breaking the political
monopolies of existing states and centralizing power at the global
level.”135 Since no communal cohesion at the global level exists - there is
no sign of a truly global “Kantian culture” (Wendt) - the emergence of an
authoritarian global regime, employing “massive coercion on a global
scale”136 would be very likely. If we want to avoid this, then we must
accept the territorial nation-state137 - in any event some decentralized
political system or another. Theorists varying from John Rawls to
Kenneth Waltz rightly agree that a world government “would either be a
global despotism or else would rule over a fragile empire torn by frequent
civil strive as various regions and peoples tried to gain their political
freedom and autonomy.”138 One such outcome of a world state is that
then, as David Miller notes, “states would have an obligation to accept
outside economic management in the event that this proved to be the most
effective way of raising the living standards of the worst-off members of
the poorer states.”139 This drastic outcome illustrates how dangerous a
world state would be.
124 and Richard Devetak and Richard Higgott, “Justice Unbound? Globalization,
States and the Transformation of the Social Bond,” International Affairs 75 (1999):
483-498, p. 496.
135 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New
York: Basic Books), p. 30, compare p. 34; see also Stanley Hoffmann, “Dreams of a
Just World,” New York Review of Books 42 (November 2, 1995): 52-57, p. 54.
136 Walzer, Spheres of Justice, p. 38.
137 Ibid., p. 44.
138 Rawls, Law of Peoples, p. 36; compare Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International
Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 112: “The prospect of world
government would be an invitation to prepare for world civil war.”
139 David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 108 and “The
Nation-State: A Modest Defence,” in Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical
Perspectives, ed. Chris Brown (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 151. This objection is
raised against Beitz, but could also have been raised against Barry, who explicitly
favors international intervention as well as international redistribution: if the members
of a government make the case for aid disappear by putting resources away in Swiss
bank accounts, “a strong prima facie case for international intervention to displace
this government then exists.” See “Statism and Nationalism,” quotation p. 40.
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Consequently, an “ideal” world government, fully committed to the ideal
of global justice, is simply utopian.140 It would be false to believe that the
United Nations will ever be able to play such a role: it is not strong
enough and not in a position to guarantee compliance. Indeed, as only its
name indicates, its very conception is thoroughly dependent on drawing
on the basic political and social organizations prevalent in the respective
states.141 The United Nations itself is a main sign that it would be false, at
best naïve, to believe that the decentralized state of worldwide
international politics is some remediable contingency.
In conclusion, as a political theory cosmopolitan liberalism fails to meet
the realistic utopia criterion. It is not capable of offering adequate
guidance to international political choice, for applying the moral ideal of
global justice to international politics would be to overstrain it.
Politically, cosmopolitan liberalism, despite its own claim to institutional
agnosticism, seems to reason as if a centralized state and government of
the ideal sort either is already in place or will fall down from heaven on
earth, so to speak.142 As such, its utopianism is idealistic: for all its
critical, moral power, it is politically inadequate.
FROM COSMOPOLITAN LIBERALISM TO COSMOPOLITAN
PLURALISM AS REALISTIC UTOPIA
Thus far, my argument has been that cosmopolitan liberalism is
inadequate as an international political theory. If correct, then the belief
that the basic task of international politics is to create global justice must
be deemed naïve. It is sometimes argued that the recent dominance of
political theory by the Rawlsian paradigm of politics as applied ethics and
political philosophy as a branch of ethics143 has doomed it to irrelevance
and danger.144 While I have not examined the validity of this argument in
140 Compare Hoffmann, “Dreams of a Just World,” p. 55.
141 Amartya Sen, “Global Justice: Beyond International Equity,” in Global Public
Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, ed. Inge Kaul, Isabelle
Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 119;
compare Barry, “Statism and Nationalism,” pp. 27-28 and Brilmayer, “Realism
Revisited,” p. 211.
142 Only then it makes sense to proceed on the assumption that “the consequences of
political action can be predicted with sufficient confidence to establish their
relationship to the social ideal.” Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations,
p. 170.
143 Compare Kymlicka’s treatment in his textbook Contemporary Political
Philosophy.
144 Frank R. Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy beyond Fact and
Value (Stanford, Cali.: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 1-20.
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the domestic case, I believe to have shown that it holds in the
international case. In hiding itself behind a veil of institutional agnostic
consequentialism, cosmopolitan-liberal political theory plays down the
question of what basically is typical of international politics. In fact, it
tacitly assumes that international politics possesses the capacity to create
a just global society; is not deeply hampered by path-dependencies,
power relations, institutional realities, unintended consequences, plain
ignorance, limited trust, technical problems; and is not fundamentally
affected by the conditions of anarchy and mixed human nature. In short,
cosmopolitan liberalism takes the overridingness of the moral value of
justice in international politics for granted, as if its historical and power
dimensions of international politics do not matter at a basic level.
The above analysis does not imply that one must return from
cosmopolitan liberalism to international skepticism.145 Nothing I have
said suggests that moral considerations, particularly of justice conceived
of as fairness between persons worldwide, have no independent role to
play in international politics, even if that role should be subjected to
certain limits. What does follow from my account is that international
political theory should widen its horizon, and move beyond the liberal
ethical focus on global distributive justice. Thus, we must search for a
position that synthesizes the cosmopolitan-liberal ideal of justice and the
realist emphasis on order and power, offering an ideal conception of
international politics that does meet the criterion of realistic utopia.146 I
now elaborate this.
Ethically, I have assumed that we should endorse the cosmopolitan-
liberal view of global justice - a value so important as to be overriding.
This assumption entails that justice should govern the global society
uncompromisingly, and that a global injustice is tolerable only when it is
145 For convincing critiques of international skepticism see Beitz, Political Theory and
International Relations, pp. 11-66; Marshall Cohen, “Moral Skepticism and
International Relations,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 13 (1984): 299-346; Nigel
Dower, World Ethics: The New Agenda (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1998), pp. 27-48; Michael W. Doyle, “Ethics and Foreign Policy: A Speculative
Essay,” in New Labour’s Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade? Ed. Richard Little
and Mark Wickam-Jones (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); Joseph S.
Nye, Jr., Nuclear Ethics (New York, N.Y.: The Free Press, 1986), pp. 6-10.
146 Compare David Boucher, who argues that a satisfactory international political
theory somehow synthesizes the insights of the traditions of “universal moral order” –
global justice - and “empirical realism” – state power - into a third position that
simultaneously incorporates the historical dimension of international politics.
Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present
(Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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necessary to avoid greater injustice.147 But politically-philosophically, we
should abandon liberalism in international theory precisely because of its
monism. Rather than to overplay the value of global justice, international
political theory must be pluralist in including a set of different basic,
possibly conflicting values.
Thus, first, international political theory must accept that the moral value
of global justice is not the single overriding value, but a conditional one.
Second, it must also include those values that, even if non-moral, are
normatively inherent to international politics as preferably and
ineradicably organized in a decentralized instead of a centralized way.
While values such as “national security and well-being” and
“international order” are not internationally fundamental in the moral
sense – although at times they may be morally significant in an indirect
manner - they are so in the political sense. For statesmen are bound by
their role to defend the core interests of their own unit, and should, alone
and together, do so prudentially and so by preserving order between all
the units. And third, it must accept the latter two values to set limits to the
moral value of global justice. While a presumption in favor of the value
of justice exists for moral reasons - and that is why I keep the adjective
“cosmopolitan” - depending on the depth of anarchy the other ones in
particular, presumably many, contexts or circumstances may overrule
it.148 Thus, in one context the statesman may have to acknowledge that
the value of global justice overrides the value of international order, if
that means leaving tyrants with a free hand, 149 and so that he should seek
cooperation with leaders of other states to eliminate the injustice. In other
contexts, he may have to decide that the security or economic threats his
own citizens face have priority, and justify the curbing of global justice.
Indeed, the realistically utopian cosmopolitan pluralist would presumably
reject one possible outcome of cosmopolitan liberalism, namely that “a
war of self-defense fought by an affluent nation against a poorer nation
pressing legitimate claims under the global principles (for example, for
147 What Rawls claims for domestic society holds globally: “Justice is the first virtue
of social institutions…[and] an injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid
even greater injustice…[J]ustice [is]…uncompromising.” Theory of Justice, pp. 3-4;
compare Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, p. 129.
148 My account is inspired by John Kekes, The Morality of Pluralism (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1993), especially chs. 9 and 11. Kekes shows that
pluralism is conceptually distinct from liberalism, and also offers a reasonable
account of why even moral values cannot always be seen as overriding; in political as
well as personal life, moral values do not necessarily take precedence in conflicts with
non-moral values. I think Kekes’s pluralist vision of all values as conditional applies
in particular to the politics of global society: there is a limit to what can reasonably be
asked of states and their trustees for the purpose of global justice.
149 Barry, “Statism and Nationalism,” p. 38.
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increased food aid) might be unjustifiable, giving rise to a justified refusal
to participate in the affluent nation’s armed forces.”150
Let me offer an example in which the realistically utopian force of
cosmopolitan pluralism clearly comes to the fore: the normative
evaluation of the European Union (EU). Ethically, if we adopt a
cosmopolitan-liberal perspective, then we would presumably criticize the
EU per se for embodying the wrong value priorities of European states
and their leaders. For of course, global distributive justice is not, and
cannot be, a primary goal of European integration; instead, its primary
goal is global peace and security for Europeans in a broad sense.
However defined and legitimized, the EU remains a form of large-scale
group particularism that includes some and excludes others, thereby
sustaining unequal treatment.151 Particularly, we might condemn its
agricultural policy - by far the largest single item of EU spending, taking
up about half of the budget every year, dominating EU external trade
policy, distorting the world market and seriously undermining the ability
of poorer countries to export their own agricultural production - as a
flagrant violation of global distributive justice.152 But politically-
philosophically, if we adopt a cosmopolitan-pluralist perspective, then we
would have to acknowledge that political leaders who operate on the
basis of such a moral critique of the EU would act idealistically and
naïvely.153 For then we could see the normative significance of the EU,
not merely for national security and well-being but especially for
international order, since it promotes international peace, geopolitical
balance, the rule of law, and sets an example. In so doing, the EU
embodies the political virtue of prudence. Yet we should insist the EU
leaders to act more according to the ideal of global justice than they seem
to do at present, notably by stopping to subsidize European agriculture
and resisting the rise of a “European people” who regard Europe as their
“second fatherland.”154
In short, as international politics cannot have the moral value of global
justice as its sole normative orientation, international political theory
150 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, pp. 175-176.
151 Nico Wilterdink, “An Examination of European and National Identity,” Archives
Européennes de Socialogie 34 (1993): 119-136.
152 Compare Noel Malcolm, “The case against ‘Europe’,” Foreign Affairs 47, 2 (1995):
52-68 and Andrew Hurrell, “Global Inequality and International Institutions,”
Metaphilosophy 32 (2001): 34-57.
153 Compare Wilterdink, “An Examination of European and National Identity.”
154 For an argument for “Euro-patriotism,” see Jacques Delors, Le Nouveau Concert
Européen. (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1992), p. 332 and especially Jos De Beus, “Quasi-
National European Identity and European Democracy,” Law and Philosophy 20
(2001): 283-311. For a critique, see Menno R. Kamminga, “For Love of Europe:
Ethics and the Case for Euro-Patriotism,” Acta Politica 36 (2001): 227-251.
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must move on from cosmopolitan liberalism to what I have called
cosmopolitan pluralism. There are directly normative reasons why one
cannot ask of states, statesmen, and international institutions merely to
strive for global justice, and these reasons involve the need for concern
for such non-moral values as international order, and national security
and well-being. In being realistically utopian this way, cosmopolitan
pluralism may well possess the action-guiding force appropriate to
international political choice.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that, when it comes to offering normative guidance to
international political choice, cosmopolitan liberalism suffers from
having an overambitious conception of what international politics may
establish, and therefore falls short as a political theory. Ethically, I have
assumed that cosmopolitan liberalism is right in claiming that
international justice is fundamentally about fairness to persons, and so
that the more global justice there is, the better the global society is.
However, from a political-philosophical perspective, cosmopolitan
liberalism falls short for its poor vision of international politics, not
acknowledging that global justice has its political limits. International
politics certainly offers room for moral vision, but is also characterized
by cynicism, unpredictability, and the duties of leadership. In conceiving
of global justice as the sole normative orientation in international politics,
which, however, is a domain of tragedy as well, cosmopolitan liberalism
is mistaken for being idealistically utopian.
Consequently, in an effort to make international political theory truly
political, which means that its “realistic” quality must be increased, I
have opted for a cosmopolitan-realist synthesis, called “cosmopolitan
pluralism.” Given both the fundamental moral significance of a just
global society and the fundamental political significance of a
decentralized international system, international political theory should
encompass three basic values: global justice (because of its fundamental
moral value), international order, and national security and well-being
(because of their fundamental political value). Generally, the main task of
international politics is gradually to implement the first as much as it can,
constantly paying due regard to the limits set by the second and third –
clearly a task that requires much practical wisdom.
Naturally, I accept that the international political theory I favor is subject
to ethical criticism; I myself endorse the cosmopolitan-liberal critique
that it falls short from the moral point of view. But, given the non-
congruence of morality and politics in the international domain, which is
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part of our human condition, c’est la vie. My point, though, has not been
that global justice is impossible per se; rather, my point has been that it is
beyond the grasp of international politics, and that we should take care
not to overstrain it. Closing the gap would at least require that moral
cosmopolitanism turns into a cultural fact everywhere, so that the
overwhelmingly majority of people will become moral cosmopolitans,
ready to part with their institutions in their current form and embark on a
great reforming mission.155 But the reason why this would be purely
utopian is that it requires something that politics cannot supply, and it
would be false to believe that mere education towards global citizenship,
even if necessary,156 would be sufficient. Indeed, it requires no less than
that men - by way of “deep transformation,” that is, conversion - stop
being “as they are” (Rawls), and start to make other individual, social,
and cultural choices, so that choice on the global scale may eventually
develop, too. It is only in such an ideal world that politics could produce
the modest global central coordinating mechanism adequate to the task of
making the moral dream of global justice come true.157 But international
political theory cannot presuppose such a world, making its ideal
conception of politics dependent on it. It must adopt a more modest level
of normative discourse, and set standards that can guide the major
international political actors forcefully.
155 Legutko, “Cosmopolitans and Communitarians,” p. 231.
156 See Martha Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in
Liberal Education (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).
157 In a weak version, a global government would be needed even when individuals
and states do act fairly. As the overall result of separate and independent transactions
might well be away from and not toward background justice, the tendency is for
background justice to be eroded. Compare for this reasoning by analogy Rawls,
Political Liberalism, p. 267.
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